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Abstract
We consider the problem of verifying finite precision implementation
of linear time-invariant controllers against mathematical specifications. A
specification may have multiple correct implementations which are different from each other in controller state representation, but equivalent
from a perspective of input-output behavior (e.g., due to optimization in
a code generator). The implementations may use finite precision computations (e.g. floating-point arithmetic) which cause quantization (i.e.,
roundoff) errors. To address these challenges, we first extract a controller’s
mathematical model from the implementation via symbolic execution and
floating-point error analysis, and then check approximate input-output
equivalence between the extracted model and the specification by similarity checking. We show how to automatically verify the correctness of
floating-point controller implementation in C language using the combination of techniques such as symbolic execution and convex optimization
problem solving. We demonstrate the scalability of our approach through
evaluation with randomly generated controller specifications of realistic
size.

1

Introduction

Most modern safety- and life-critical embedded applications rely on softwarebased control for their operation. When reasoning about safety of these systems, it is extremely important to ensure that control software is correctly
implemented. In this paper, we study the problem of whether a given piece of
software is a faithful representation of an abstract specification of the control
function.
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We assume a commonly used development approach, where control systems
are developed in a model-driven fashion. The model captures both the dynamics
of the “plant”, the entity to be controlled, and the controller itself, as mathematical expressions using well established tools, such as Simulink and Stateflow.
Control theory offers a rich set of techniques to determine these expressions, determine their parameters, and perform analysis of the model to conclude whether
the plant model adequately describes the system to be controlled and whether
the controller achieves the desired goals of the control system. In this work,
we assume that such control design activities have been performed, achieving
the acceptable degree of assurance for the control design. In other words, we
assume that the mathematical model of the controller is correct with respect to
any higher-level requirements and can be used as the specification for a software
implementation of the controller.
Typically, control software is obtained by code generation from the mathematical model. Code generation tools such as Embedded Coder are widely
used. Ideally, we would like to have these code generation tools to be verified,
that is, to offer guarantees that generated code correctly computes the control
function. In this case, no verification of the control code would be needed. However, commercially available code generators are complex black-box tools and
are generally not amenable to formal verification. Subtle bugs have been found
in commercially available code generators in the past [25]. In the absence of verified code generators, we would like to be able to verify instances of generated
code with respect to their mathematical specification.
In our past work [26, 28], we explored several approaches to the verification
of implementations of linear time invariant (LTI) controllers. In LTI controllers,
the relationships between the values of inputs and state variables, and between
state variables and outputs, are captured as linear functions, and coefficients
of these functions are constant (i.e., time-invariant). The main limitation in
all of these approaches is the assumption that the calculations are performed
using real numbers. Of course, real numbers are a mathematical abstraction. In
practice, software performs calculations using a limited-precision representation
of numbers, such as the floating-point representation. The use of floating-point
numbers introduces errors into the computation, which have to be accounted
for in the verification process.
In this paper, we build on the work of [28], which follows an equivalence
checking approach. We apply symbolic execution to the generated code, which
calculates symbolic expressions for the values of state and output variables in
the code at the completion of the invocation of the controller. We use these
symbolic values to reconstruct a mathematical representation of the control
function. We introduce error terms into this representation that characterize
the effects of numerical errors. The verification step then tries to establish
the approximate equivalence between the specification of the control function
and the reconstructed representation. In [28], we considered two promising
alternatives for assessing the equivalence: one based on SMT solving and the
other one based on convex optimization. Somewhat surprisingly, when the error
terms that account for floating-point calculations are added, the SMT-solving
2

approach becomes impractical, while the optimization-based approach suffers
minimal degradation in performance.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background of LTI
systems. Section 3 describes how to extract a model from the controller code.
Section 4 presents the approximate equivalence checking. Section 5 evaluates
the scalability of our approach. Section 6 and 7 provide an overview of related
work and conclude the paper.

2

Preliminaries

This section presents preliminaries on LTI controllers and their software implementations. We also introduce two real-world examples that motivate the
problem considered in this paper, as well as the problem statement.

2.1

Linear Feedback Controller

The goal of feedback controllers is to ensure that the closed-loop systems have
certain desired behaviors. In general, these controllers derive suitable control
inputs to the plants (i.e., systems to control) based on previously obtained measurements of the plant outputs. In this paper, we consider a general class of
feedback controllers that can be specified as linear time-invariant (LTI) controllers in the standard state-space representation form:
zk+1 = Azk + Buk
yk = Czk + Duk .

(1)

where uk ∈ Rp , yk ∈ Rm and zk ∈ Rn are the input vector, the output vector
and the state vector at time k respectively. The matrices A ∈ Rn×n , B ∈
Rn×p , C ∈ Rm×n and D ∈ Rm×p together with the initial controller state z0
completely specify an LTI controller. Thus, we use Σ(A, B, C, D, z0 ) to denote
an LTI controller, or just use Σ(A, B, C, D) when the initial controller state z0
is zero.
During the control-design phase, controller Σ(A, B, C, D, z0 ) is derived to
guarantee the desired closed-loop performance, while taking into account available computation and communication resources (e.g., finite-precision arithmetic
logic units). This model (i.e., controller specification) is then usually ‘mapped’
into a software implementation of a step function that: (1) maintains the state of
the controller, and updates it every time new sensor measurements are available
(i.e., when it’s invoked); and (2) computes control outputs (i.e., inputs applied
to the plant) from the the current controller’s state and incoming sensor measurements. In most embedded control systems, the step function is periodically
invoked, or whenever new sensor measurements arrive. In this work, as in our
previous work [28], we assume that data is exchanged with the step function
through global variables.1 In other words, the input, output and state variables
1 This convention is used by Embedded Coder, a code generation toolbox for Matlab/Simulink.
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are declared in the global scope, and the step function reads both input and
state variables, and updates both output and state variables as the effect of its
execution. It is worth noting however that this assumption does not critically
limit our approach because it can be easily extended to support a different code
interface for the step function.

2.2

Motivating Examples

To motivate our work, we introduce two examples from [26, 28]. These examples
illustrate limitations of the standard verification techniques that directly utilize
the mathematical model from (1), in cases when controller software is generated
by a code generator whose optimizations potentially violate the model while still
ensuring the desired control functionality.
2.2.1

A Scalar Linear Integrator.

Consider a simple controller that computes control input uk as a scaled sum of
all previous sensor data yi ∈ R, i = 0, ..., k − 1 – i.e.,
uk =

k−1
X

αyi , k > 1,

and,

u0 = 0.

(2)

i=0

Now, if we use the Simulink Integrator block with Forward Euler integration to
implement this controller, the resulting controller model will be Σ(1, α, 1, 0), –
i.e., zk+1 = zk + αyk , uk = zk . On the other hand, a realization Σ̂(1, 1, α, 0)
– i.e., zk+1 = zk + yk , uk = αzk , of the controller would introduce a reduced
computational error when finite precision arithmetics is used [10]. Thus, controller specification (2) may result in two different software implementations due
to the use of different code generation tools. Still, it is important to highlight
that these two implementations would have identical input-output behavior –
the only difference is whether they maintain a scaled or unscaled sum of the
previous sensor measurements.
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2.2.2

Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output Controllers.

Now, consider a more general Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output (MIMO) controller with two inputs and two outputs, and which maintains five states


−0.500311
0.16751
0.028029 −0.395599 −0.652079
 0.850942
0.181639
−0.29276
0.481277
0.638183 



zk+1 =  −0.458583 −0.002389 −0.154281 −0.578708 −0.769495 
 zk +
 1.01855
0.638926 −0.668256 −0.258506 0.119959 
0.100383 −0.432501 0.122727
0.82634
0.892296
|
{z
}
A


1.1149
0.164423
 −1.56592 0.634384 



(3)
+
 1.04856 −0.196914  uk
 1.96066
3.11571 
−3.02046 −1.96087
|
{z
}
B


0.283441 0.032612 −0.75658
0.085468
0.161088
yk =
zk (4)
−0.528786 0.050734 −0.681773 −0.432334 −1.17988
|
{z
}
C

The controller has to perform 25 + 10 = 35 multiplications as part of the
state z update in every invocation of the step function. On the other hand, the
following controller requires only 5 + 10 = 15 multiplications for state update.


0.87224
0
0
0
0


0
0.366378
0
0
0


 ẑk +
0
0
−0.540795
0
0
ẑk+1 = 




0
0
0
−0.332664
0
0
0
0
0
−0.204322
|
{z
}
Â




+


|


0.822174 −0.438008
−0.278536 −0.824313 

0.874484
0.858857 
 uk ,
−0.117628 −0.506362 
−0.955459 −0.622498
{z
}

(5)

B̂


yk =

−0.793176
0.503767

|

0.154365 −0.377883 −0.360608
−0.573538 0.170245 −0.583312
{z

−0.142123
−0.56603


ẑk
}

Ĉ

(6)
The above controllers Σ and Σ̂ are similar,2 which means that the same input
sequences yk delivered to both controllers, would result in identical outputs of
2 Similarity

transform is formally defined in Section 4.
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the controllers. Note that the controller’s states will likely differ. Consequently,
the ‘diagonalized’ controller Σ̂ results in the same control performance and thus
provides the same control functionality as Σ, while violating the state evolution
model of the initial controller Σ. The motivation for the use of the diagonalized
controller comes from a significantly reduced computational cost that allow for
the utilization of resource constrained embedded platforms. In general, any
controller (1), would require n2 + np = n(n + p) multiplications to update its
state. This can be significantly reduced when matrix A in (1) is diagonal – in
this case only n + np = n(p + 1) multiplications are needed.

2.3

Problem Statements

As illustrated with the motivating examples, the initial controller model and its
implementation (i.e., step function) may be different from each other in representation (i.e., controller parameters, state representation) due to the optimization
of code generators, while being functionally equivalent from the input-output
perspective. Thus, we would like to develop the verification technique that is
not sensitive to the state representation of the controller. Moreover, the controller software for embedded systems uses a finite precision arithmetic which
introduces rounding errors in the computation. Thus, it is necessary to analyze
the effect of rounding errors in the verification process. This work focuses on
the controller implementations using floating-point arithmetic, but can be easily extended to the setup for fixed-point arithmetic. Consequently, our problem
statements are as follows: given an LTI model, a step function using floatingpoint arithmetic and an approximate equivalence precision, verify if the step
function is approximately equivalent to the initial LTI model from the inputoutput perspective.

3

Extracting Model from Floating-Point Controller Implementation

Our approach to the verification of a controller implementation against its mathematical model takes two steps: we first extract a model from the finite precision implementation (i.e., step function using floating-point arithmetic), and
then compare it with the original model. This approach is an extension of [28]
to consider the quantization error in the finite-precision implementation. To
obtain a model from the step function, we employ the symbolic execution technique [7, 21], which allows us to identify the computation of the step function
(i.e., the big-step transition relation on global states between before and after
the execution of the step function). From the transition relation, we extract a
mathematical model for the controller implementation. Since the implementation has floating-point quantization (i.e., roundoff) errors, the representation of
the extracted model includes roundoff error terms, thus being different from the
representation of the initial LTI model (1). We will describe the representation
of extracted models in the next subsection.
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3.1

Quantized Controller Model

A finite precision computation (e.g., floating-point arithmetic) involves rounding errors, which makes the computation result slightly deviated from the exact
value that might be computed with the infinite precision computation. The
floating-point rounding error can be modeled with the notions of both absolute
error and relative error. The absolute error is defined as the difference between an exact number and its rounded number. The relative error defines such
difference relative to the exact number. To model quantized controller implementations, we extend the representation of LTI model (1) with the new terms
of absolute errors and relative errors, and obtain the following representation of
quantized controller model:
ẑk+1 = (Â + EA )ẑk + (B̂ + EB )uk + ez
yk = (Ĉ + EC )ẑk + (D̂ + ED )uk + ey .

(7)

where Â, B̂, Ĉ and D̂ are controller parameters. EA , EB , EC and ED are the
relative errors regarding the state and input variables which are bounded by the
relative error bound brel such that kEA k , kEB k , kEC k , kED k ≤ brel where k·k
is the L∞ norm operator. In addition, ez and ey are the absolute errors which
are bounded by the absolute error bound babs such that kex k , key k ≤ babs .
In the rest of this section, we explain how to extract a quantized controller
model (Â, B̂, Ĉ, D̂, brel , babs ) from the floating-point controller implementation
via symbolic execution and floating-point error analysis techniques.

3.2

Symbolic Execution of Floating-Point Controller Implementation

In our approach, the symbolic execution technique [7, 21] is employed to analyze
the step function C code. We symbolically execute the step function with symbolic values such as symbolic inputs and symbolic controller states, and examine
the change of the program’s global state where the output and new controller
state are updated with symbolic expressions in terms of the symbolic values.
The goal of the symbolic execution in our approach is to find symbolic formulas that concisely represent the computation of the step function C code that
originally has loops and pointer arithmetic operations. The idea behind this
symbolic execution process is that the linear controller implementations that
we consider in this work have simple control flows for the sake of deterministic
real-time behaviors (e.g., fixed upper bound of loops), thus being amenable to
our symbolic execution process. Consequently, the symbolic execution of linear controller implementations yield finite and deterministic symbolic execution
paths [28].
However, unlike [28], our work herein newly considers the effect of floatingpoint rounding errors in the step function. Thus it is necessary to pay special
attention (e.g., normalization [6]) to the floating-point computation in symbolic
execution. When symbolic expressions are constructed with floating-point operators in the course of symbolic execution, the evaluation order of floating-point
7

operations should be preserved according to the floating-point program semantics, because floating-point arithmetic does not hold basic algebraic properties
such as associativity and distributivity in general.
Once the symbolic execution is completed, symbolic formulas are produced.
The symbolic formulas represent the computation of the step function in a
concise way (i.e., in the arithmetic expression form without loops, function calls
and side effects). The produced symbolic formula has the following form, which
we call transition equation:
v (new) = f (v1 , v2 , . . . , vt )

(8)

where v (new) is a global variable which is updated with the symbolic expression,
vi are the initial symbolic values of the corresponding variables before the symbolic execution of the step function. f (v1 , v2 , . . . , vt ) is the symbolic expression
that consists of floating-point operations where t is the number of variables used
in f . This expression should preserve the correct order of evaluation according
to the floating-point semantics of the step function C code.
For example, consider the step function in [27] , which is generated by Embedded Coder (the code generator of MATLAB/Simulink) for the LTI controller
models (5)(6). We illustrate one of the transition equations obtained from the
symbolic execution of the step function as follows:
(new)

(((((0.503767 ⊗ x[0]) ⊕ (−0.573538 ⊗ x[1])) ⊕ (0.170245 ⊗ x[2]))
⊕(−0.583312 ⊗ x[3])) ⊕ (−0.56603 ⊗ x[4])).
(9)
where x is the shortened name for LTIS DW.Internal DSTATE, and y is the
shortened name for LTIS Y.y for presentation purposes only, and ⊕,
and ⊗
are floating-point operators corresponding to +, − and × respectively. In the
next subsection, we explain how to extract the quantized model (17) from the
symbolic expressions.
y[1]

3.3

=

Quantization Error Analysis and Model Extraction

This subsection explains how to extract the quantized controller model (17)
from a set of symbolic expressions (8) obtained from the step function. The
symbolic expression consists of floating-point operations of symbolic values and
numeric constants. We first describe how to analyze the floating-point quantization (i.e., roundoff) error in the symbolic expression evaluation. Since we
only consider linear controller implementations rejecting nonlinear cases in the
symbolic execution phase, the symbolic expression f obtained from the step
function has the the following syntax, thus guaranteeing the linearity:
f := v | f ⊕ f | f

f | f ~ fc | fc ~ f

fc := c | fc ~ fc
where v is a variable (i.e., the initial symbolic value of the variable), c is a
constant, and ~ ∈ {⊕, , ⊗}. fc is a sub-expression which contains no variable,
8

thus being evaluated to a constant, while f contains at least one variable. The
multiplication operation ⊗ appears only when at least one operand is a constantexpression fc , thus preventing the expression from being nonlinear (i.e., the
product of two symbolic values).
In order to simplify a certain program analysis problem, a common assumption is often made in the literature [14, 28] that the floating-point operations
(e.g., ⊕, and ⊗) behave the same way as the real operations (e.g., +, − and ×)
with no rounding. Under this assumption, the equation (8) can be represented
in the following canonical form [28]:
v

(new)

=

t
X

ci vi

(10)

i=1

where t is the number of product terms, v,vi are variables, and ci is the coefficient. In reality, however, floating-point numbers have limited precision, and
the floating-point operations involve rounding errors. In this work, we consider
the effect of such floating-point rounding errors in the verification.
The IEEE 754 standard [1] views a finite precision floating-point operation
as the corresponding real operation followed by a rounding operation:
x1 ~ x2 = rnd(x1 ∗ x2 )

(11)

where ~ ∈ {⊕, , ⊗} and ∗ is the corresponding real arithmetic operation to
~. A rounding operator rnd is a function that takes a real number as input
and returns as output a floating-point number that is closest to the input real
number, thus causes a quantization error (i.e., rounding error) in the floatingpoint operation. There are multiple common rounding operators (e.g. round
to the nearest, ties to even) defined in the IEEE 754 standard [1]. A rounding
operator can be modeled as follows [15]:
rnd(x) = x(1 + e) + d

(12)

for some e and d where e is a relative error, d is an absolute error, and |e| ≤ 
and |d| ≤ δ.  and δ can be determined according to the rounding mode and the
precision (i.e., the number of bits) of the system. For example,  = 2−53 and
δ = 2−1075 for the double precision (i.e., 64 bits) rounding to the nearest [33].
Combining the two equations (11) and (12), we have the following model for
the floating-point operations:
x1 ~ x2 = (x1 ∗ x2 )(1 + e) + d

(13)

After rewriting the symbolic expression of the transition equation (8) applying
the equation (13), suppose that we have the following equation form:
X
v (new) =
ci vi + errrel + errabs
(14)
P
where
ci vi is the exact expression as (10), and errabs is the absolute error
term bounded by babs such that |errabs | ≤ babs . errrel is the relative error term
9

which
P is related to the variables {vi } (i.e., symbolic values). We rewrite errrel
as
erri vi where erri is the relative error term specific to the variable vi , and
bi is the upper bound for erri such that |erri | ≤ bi . We relax the equation by
over-approximating each erri as follows:
X
X
v (new) =
ci vi +
erri vi + errabs
X
X
=
ci vi + err
vi + errabs
(15)
where err is bounded by brel such that |err| ≤ brel where brel is defined as
brel = max{bi }.
We now rearrange and group the product terms by variable names such
as the state variables and the input variables. We assume that the names of
input and output variables are given as the interface of the step function. The
state variables can be identified as the variables appearing in the transition
equations which are not input variables nor output variables. In addition to
the rearrangement, by transforming the sum of products into a form of scalar
product of vectors, we have:
v (new) =[c1 , c2 , ..., cn ]x + [err, err, ..., err]x
+

[c01 , c02 , ..., c0p ]u

(16)

+ [err, err, ..., err]u + errabs

where x is the vector of state variables, and u is the vector of input variables.
Finally, we rewrite the transition equations as two matrix equations as follows:
x(new) = (Â + EA )x + (B̂ + EB )u + ex
y(new) = (Ĉ + EC )x + (D̂ + ED )u + ey .

(17)

where Â ∈ Rn×n , B̂ ∈ Rn×p , Ĉ ∈ Rm×n and D̂ ∈ Rm×p . The matrices for
the relative errors are bounded by b∗rel such that kEA k , kEB k , kEC k , kED k ≤
b∗rel . The absolute error vectors ex and ey are bounded by b∗abs such that
kex k , key k ≤ b∗abs . Note that b∗rel and b∗abs can be easily determined using
brel and babs obtained from the floating-point error analysis for each transition
equation.
For example, consider the transition equation (9), from which via the floatingpoint error analysis, we have:
(new)

(((((0.503767 ⊗ x[0]) ⊕ (−0.573538 ⊗ x[1])) ⊕ (0.170245 ⊗ x[2]))
⊕(−0.583312 ⊗ x[3])) ⊕ (−0.56603 ⊗ x[4]))
= 0.503767 · x[0] + −0.573538 · x[1] + 0.170245 · x[2]
+ − 0.583312 · x[3] + −0.56603 · x[4] + errrel + errabs
= 0.503767 · x[0] + −0.573538 · x[1] + 0.170245 · x[2]
+ − 0.583312 · x[3] + −0.56603 · x[4]
+err(x[0] + x[1] + x[2] + x[3] + x[4]) + errabs
(18)
988331
 ÷ (1 − 4) = brel , and |errabs | ≤ 4 · (1 + )4 · δ = babs .
where |err| ≤ 250000
For the double precision (i.e., 64 bits) rounding to nearest (i.e.,  = 2−53 and
δ = 2−1075 ), brel ≈ 4.389071 × 10−16 and babs ≈ 1.235164 × 10−323 .
y[1]

=
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4

Approximate Input-Output Equivalence Checking

In order to verify a finite precision implementation of the linear controller, the
previous section described how to extract the quantized controller model from
the implementation. In this section, we introduce how to compare the extracted
model (17) and the initial model (1) with a notion of approximate input-output
(IO) equivalence.

4.1

Approximate Input-Output Equivalence

This subsection defines an approximate IO equivalence relation, inspired by the
similarity transformation of LTI systems [30]. In order for two LTI systems to
be IO equivalent to each other, there must exist an invertible linear mapping
T from one system’s state z to another system’s state ẑ such that z = Tẑ
and ẑ = T−1 z. The matrix T is referred to as the similarity transformation
matrix [30]. Assuming that a proper T is given, we substitute zk by Tẑ in the
initial LTI model (1), thus having:
Tẑk+1 = ATẑk + Buk ,

yk = CTẑk + Duk .

or
ẑk+1 = (T−1 AT)ẑk + (T−1 B)uk ,

yk = (CT)ẑk + Duk .

(19)

By the similarity transformation, two LTI systems (1) and (19) are similar,
meaning that they are IO equivalent. We now compare the transformed initial
LTI model (19) and the quantized controller model (17) that is extracted from
the step function. Equating the corresponding coefficient matrices of the two
models (19) and (17), we have:
T−1 AT = Â + EA ,

T−1 B = B̂ + EB ,

CT = Ĉ + EC ,

AT = TÂ + TEA ,

B = TB̂ + TEB ,

CT = Ĉ + EC ,

D = D̂ + ED

or
D = D̂ + ED
(20)
However, the equality of the exact equivalence condition (20) will never hold
because of the floating-point error terms (e.g., EA ) and the numerical errors
in the implementation’s controller parameters (e.g., Â) due to the optimization
of the code generator. To overcome this problem, we define and use an approximate equivalence relation ≈ρ on matrices such that M ≈ρ M̂ if and only
if M − M̂ ≤ ρ where ρ is a given precision (i.e., threshold for approximate
equivalence). Note that the approximate equivalence relation ≈ρ is not transitive, thus not an equivalence relation unless ρ = 0. With ≈ρ for a precision ρ,
the equations (20) are relaxed as follows:
AT ≈ρ TÂ + TEA ,

B ≈ρ TB̂ + TEB ,
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CT ≈ρ Ĉ + EC ,

D ≈ρ D̂ + ED
(21)

Finally, we say that the initial LTI model (1) and the quantized model (17)
extracted from the implementation are approximately IO equivalent with precision ρ if there exists a similarity transformation matrix T which satisfies (21),
and the absolute errors of the floating-point computations are negligible (i.e.,
ez ≈ρ 0 and ey ≈ρ 0). Note that the problem of checking the approximate IO
equivalence is the problem of finding a proper similarity transformation matrix.
In the rest of this section, we explain how to find the similarity transformation
matrix using a satisfiability problem formulation and a convex optimization
problem formulation.

4.2

Satisfiability Problem Formulation

This section discusses the satisfiability problem formulation for the approximate
IO equivalence checking. To find the similarity transformation matrix using
existing SMT solvers, the problem can be formulated roughly as follows:
∃T : ∀EA , EB , EC , ED : kEA k , kEB k , kEC k , kED k ≤ brel =⇒ (21) holds
In this formulation, the variable T and the relative error variables (e.g., EA )
are quantified alternately, thus requiring exists/forall (EF) problem solving.
Moreover, the formula involves the non-linear real arithmetic (NRA) due to the
terms TEA and TEB in (21). For these reasons, the scalability of this SMT
formulation-based approach is questionable because the current SMT solvers
rarely supports EF-NRA problem solving with scalability. In the next subsection, we describe a more efficient approach based on convex optimization as an
alternative method.

4.3

Convex Optimization Formulation

This subsection describes the convex optimization-based approach to the approximate IO equivalence checking. Since the relative error variables EA make
the condition (21) inappropriate to be formulated as a convex optimization
problem, our approach is to derive a sufficient condition for (21). By overapproximating the error terms and removing the error variables, we derive such
a sufficient condition for (21) which is formulated as a convex optimization
problem as follows:
variables

e ∈ R, T ∈ Rn×n

minimize

e

subject to

ÂT − TA
B̂ − TB
ĈT − C

∞

∞
∞

+ n2 kTk∞ brel ≤ e

(22)

+ n2 kTk∞ brel ≤ e
+ n · brel ≤ e,

D̂ − D

∞

+ n · brel ≤ e

The idea behind this formulation is to use convex optimization to find the minimum precision e and then check whether e ≤ ρ where ρ is the given precision.
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(LTI model)
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result
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Figure 1: The verification toolchain
Remark 1. Our verification method is sound (i.e., no false positive) but not
complete. Due to the relaxations both in the floating-point error approximation
and the approximate IO equivalence checking, there might be a case with a model
and a correct implementation where our method remains indecisive in the equivalence decision. This can be potentially improved by tightening the relaxations
in future work. In addition, a larger ρ can make the approximate equivalence
decision positive, which is not with a smaller ρ. The IO equivalence with a large
ρ may not guarantee the controller’s well-behavedness. Relating the approximate
equivalence precision ρ and the performance of the controller (e.g., robustness)
is an avenue of future work.

5

Evaluation

This section presents our toolchain for the verification of finite precision controller implementations, and evaluates its scalability. We also evaluate computational overhead (i.e., running time) over our own earlier work [28] which
assumes that the computations of controller implementations have no rounding
errors.

5.1

Toolchain

This subsection presents the verification toolchain (shown in Fig. 1) that we
implemented based on our method described in this paper. The toolchain is an
extension of [28] to consider the floating-point error of step function in verification. The toolchain takes as input a step function C code and an LTI model
specification. We use the off-the-shelf symbolic execution tool PathCrawler [37]
to symbolically execute the step function and produce the transition equations
for the step function. From the transition equations, the model extractor based
on Section 3.3 extracts the quantized controller model using the floating-point
error analysis tool PolyFP [2]. Finally, the extracted quantized model is compared with the given specification (i.e., LTI model) based on the approximate
IO relation defined in Section 4. The approximate IO equivalence checker uses
the convex optimization solver CVX [17] to solve the formulas in Section 4.3.
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The running time of our approach
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Figure 2: The running time of both the front-end and the back-end of our
approach

5.2

Scalability Analysis

This subsection evaluates the scalability of our approach/toolchain presented
in this paper. To evaluate, we use the Matlab function drss to randomly
generate discrete stable linear controller specifications (i.e., the elements of
Σ(A, B, C, D)) varying the controller dimension n from 2 to 14. To obtain
an IO equivalent implementation, we perform an arbitrary similarity transformation on Σ, and yield the transformed model Σ̂. We use an LTI system
block of Simulink to allow the Embedded Coder (i.e., code generator of Matlab/Simulink) to generate a floating-point implementation (i.e., step function in
C) for Σ̂. Note that the generated step function has multiple loops and pointer
arithmetic operations as illustrated in the step function in [27]. We employ
our toolchain to verify that the generated step function correctly implements
the original controller model. We pick the precision ρ to be 10−6 to tolerate
both numerical errors in the similarity transformation and the floating-point
controller implementation.
We now evaluate the scalability of our approach running our toolchain with
the random controller specifications and their implementations generated. We
measure the running time of the front-end and the back-end of our approach
separately. The front-end refers to the process of symbolic execution of the
step function (using PathCrawler) and model extraction using the floating-point
analysis (using PolyFP). The back-end refers to the approximate IO equivalence
checking using convex optimization problem solving (using CVX). The scalability analysis result is shown in Fig. 2, which demonstrates that our approach is
scalable for the realistic size of controller dimension.
We now evaluate the overhead of our approach compared to the previous
work [28] where the verification problem is simpler than our verification problem herein because the previous work [28] assumes that the computation of step
function C code is exact without having any roundoff error. Our approach herein
provides a higher assurance for the finite precision controller implementations
considering the rounding errors in computation. Fig. 3 shows the computational overhead (i.e., the increase of running time) in our approach as a result of
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Figure 3: The overhead in both the front-end and the back-end of our approach
considering the floating-point roundoff error in controller implementation verification. We observe that the overhead of the floating-point error analysis in
the front-end is marginal. The running time of the back-end increases because
the convex optimization problem formulation for approximate IO equivalence
requires more computations to solve. Finally, the total running time only increases marginally from 0.4% to 7.5% over the previous work [28] at a cost of
providing higher assurance for the correctness of the finite precision computations of controller implementations.

6

Related Work

High-assurance control software for cyber physical systems has received much
attention recently (e.g., [32, 3, 24, 23, 22, 10, 12]). Focusing on robust controller implementation, [32] and [22] provide simulation-based robustness analysis tools, while [3, 24, 10, 12] studies issues related to fixed-point controller
design. [4] presents a theorem proving method to verify the control related
properties of Simulink models.
Moreover, there also has been work focusing on the code-level verification
of controller implementation. [31, 23] propose methods to check a Simulink diagram and the generated code based on the structure of the diagram and the
code, instead of input-output equivalence checking. [14, 18, 36, 35] apply the
concept of proof-carrying code to control software verification. Their approach
is to annotate the code based on Lyapunov function, and prove the properties
using the PVS linear algebra library [18]. However, they only consider stability and convergence properties rather than the equivalence between controller
specifications and the implementations. Moreover, their verification approach
may not be applicable to the code generated by existing off-the-shelf code generators because it requires the internal control of the code generators. Our
own earlier work [26, 28] presents methods to verify controller implementations
against mathematical models, yet ignores the rounding errors in the finite precision computations of controller software implementations. There has been
static analysis techniques (e.g., [5, 13, 16]) developed for the analysis of finite
precision numerical programs, but they focus on verifying properties such as
15

numerical stability, the absence of buffer overflow and the absence of arithmetic
exception rather than verifying the equivalence between code and a dynamical
system model as the specification of the controller. Finally, there has been software verification work using the model extraction technique [8, 19, 20, 34, 29],
and the floating-point roundoff error estimation has been studied in [11, 9, 33].

7

Conclusion

We have presented an approach for the verification of finite precision implementations of linear controllers against mathematical specifications. We have
proposed the use of a combination of techniques such as symbolic execution and
floating point error analysis in order to extract the quantized controller model
from finite precision linear controller implementations. We have defined an approximate input-output equivalence relation between the specification model
(i.e., linear time-invariant model) and the extracted model (i.e., quantized controller model), and presented a method to check the approximate equivalence
relation using the convex optimization formulation. We have evaluated our approach using randomly generated controller specifications and implementations
by MATLAB/Simulink/Embedded Coder. The evaluation result shows that
our approach is scalable for the realistic controller size, and the computational
overhead to analyze the effect of floating-point error is negligible compared to
our own earlier work. Future work includes the verification of a broader class
of controller implementations.
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